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Abstract
Semi-quantum key distribution protocols are designed to allow two
users to establish a secure secret key when one of the two users is limited
to performing certain “classical” operations. There have been several such
protocols developed recently, however, due to their reliance on a two-way
quantum communication channel (and thus, the attacker’s opportunity
to interact with the qubit twice), their security analysis is difficult and
little is known concerning how secure they are compared to their fully
quantum counterparts. In this paper we prove the unconditional security
of a particular semi-quantum protocol. We derive an expression for the
key rate of this protocol, in the asymptotic scenario, as a function of the
quantum channel’s noise. Finally, we will show that this semi-quantum
protocol can tolerate a maximal noise level comparable to certain fully
quantum protocols.
1 Introduction
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols are designed to allow two users,
Alice “A” and Bob “B”, to establish a shared secret key, secure against even
an all powerful adversary, Eve “E”. Generally these protocols consist of three
stages: first, the quantum communication stage, consisting of several iterations
of A and B communicating over a quantum channel; for instance A preparing
qubits in a variety of different bases, and B measuring them in different bases -
if the basis choice matches, they share a secret bit of information. Next, using
an authenticated classical channel, one which A and B may read/write to, but
E may only read from, they perform a parameter estimation stage where they
divulge a randomly chosen subset of their measurement results (along with other
∗This is an extended version of a paper published in IEEE ISIT 2015.
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data depending on the protocol) in order to estimate various statistics of the
quantum channel (in particular, the error rate of the channel). The remaining
measurement results, those which were not publicly divulged, are used as their
raw key - a string of bits which E may hold some information on, and which
may contain some discrepancies due to the error rate in the quantum channel.
If this error rate is “low enough” A and B will move on to the third stage,
running an error correction protocol and privacy amplification protocol. These
two routines, which again utilize the authenticated classical channel, will first
fix any errors in A and B’s raw key, while privacy amplification will then take as
input this error corrected raw key and output a key that is smaller, but secure.
The reader is referred to [1] for more information.
A major question is how low is “low enough” - that is how much noise can a
protocol tolerate before E potentially holds too much information on A and B’s
raw key so that privacy amplification is unable to distill a secure secret key. To
determine this, one typically considers the key rate of a QKD protocol, which
we denote by r. This quantity is the fraction of secure secret key bits after
privacy amplification, divided by the size of the raw key.
Let us first consider collective attacks [1]: those attacks where an eavesdrop-
per performs the same attack operation each iteration of the quantum commu-
nication stage (thus each iteration may be treated independently of the others),
however E is allowed to postpone her measurement until any future time of her
choice. Let N be the size of A and B’s raw key (before error correction, but after
parameter estimation). Let `(N) ≤ N denote the number of secure secret key
bits that A and B may distill after error correction and privacy amplification
(possibly `(N) = 0 if no secure key bits can be distilled). It was shown in [2]
and [3], that, in the asymptotic scenario (where N →∞):
r = lim
N→∞
`(N)
N
≥ inf(S(B|E)−H(B|A)),
where S(B|E) is the conditional von Neumann entropy, H(B|A) is the condi-
tional Shannon entropy (see next section), and the infimum is over all collective
attacks an eavesdropper may perform which conform to the statistics observed
during parameter estimation (e.g., those attacks which induce the observed error
rate). Note that above, we have written the equation when reverse reconcilia-
tion is used which seems more natural for the protocol we consider in this paper.
If the protocol in question is permutation invariant, it was shown in [4, 5] that
proving security against these collective attacks is sufficient to prove security
against general attacks - those attacks where E is allowed to perform any oper-
ation allowed within the laws of physics. The reader is again referred to [1] for
more information on this key rate equation, direct and reverse reconciliation,
the asymptotic scenario, and the various attack models commonly used.
Clearly it is desired that r > 0, in which case A and B may distill a secure se-
cret key; if r = 0, E’s attack was too strong and she holds too much information
on A and B’s raw key for privacy amplification to work. The goal then, typi-
cally, is to derive a simplified expression for the quantity inf(S(A|E)−H(A|B)),
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given an observed error rate. This expression should be a function only of values
that may be estimated by A and B during the parameter estimation stage.
1.1 Semi-Quantum Key Distribution
A semi-quantum key distribution (SQKD) protocol, first introduced in [6], has
the same goal as a QKD protocol; however now, one of the two users - typically
B - is limited to performing what are called “classical” or “semi-quantum”
operations. Namely, B is only allowed to work directly with the computational
Z basis (spanned by elements |0〉 and |1〉). These protocols are interesting from
a theoretical stand-point as they attempt to answer how “quantum” a protocol
needs to be in order to obtain a benefit over a classical protocol. Further, they
may also be practically interesting as they may require less hardware on the
limited user’s side (B).
These protocols rely on a two-way quantum communication channel, allow-
ing a qubit to travel from A to B, then back to A. The all-powerful attacker E,
who is sitting between A and B, is able now to attack the qubit twice making
the security analysis of these protocols very difficult. Up to now, most work has
been showing the robustness of a SQKD protocol. As defined in [6, 7], an SQKD
protocol is robust if, for any attack that E may perform which potentially causes
her to gain information on A or B’s raw key, necessarily induces a detectable
disturbance. Though this provides a good starting point for proving security,
it is not as powerful a result as computing the key rate equation. Robustness
only tells the users that any noise might be an attacker; the latter notion gives
a relation between the amount of noise induced by the most powerful class of
attacks E may employ, and the size of A and B’s final secret key (possibly
`(N) = 0 if there is too much noise).
While several authors have developed SQKD protocols and proven their
robustness (for instance [6, 7, 8, 9, 10]), only a few authors have considered
security of an SQKD protocol beyond robustness. In particular, [11] considered
security against individual attacks (a class of attacks weaker than collective
attacks and which do not provide a security bound against general attacks -
our primary goal); that reference managed to bound the amount of information
E may hold based on the level of noise induced by her (individual) attack.
In [10], the authors also considered a form of individual attack when proving
security of a new protocol they devised. In [12], a mediated SQKD protocol
was developed and its security against general attacks was proven (including
its key-rate equation); this is different from the setting in this paper, however,
as such a mediated protocol operates with two semi-quantum users, and an
untrusted quantum server. Finally, in [13], a series of security results were
shown for a particular class of SQKD protocol: single state protocols - ones
where A is limited to preparing and sending |+〉 each iteration of the quantum
communication stage. In this paper, however, we consider the more complicated
multi-state protocols where A is not limited in this manner (she may prepare
any qubit she likes each iteration, chosen randomly).
In this paper, we will prove, for the first time, the unconditional security
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of the SQKD protocol from [6]. In particular, we will derive a lower bound on
the key rate, based only on certain parameters A and B may estimate. We will
show that this protocol can tolerate up to 5.34% noise before A and B should
abort (that is, the key rate is strictly positive so long as the error rate is less
than 5.34%). While we cannot compare this noise threshold with other SQKD
protocols (as none others have yet been considered, besides the mediated one
mentioned earlier), this does compare favorably with certain “fully” quantum
protocols - e.g., B92 [14] which supports up to 4.8% noise [2] and a three-state
variant of BB84 which supports up to 4.25% noise [15]. Thus our results provide
further evidence that security in the semi-quantum setting can be comparable
to security in the “fully” quantum setting.
2 Notation
Given a set of real values {p1, p2, · · · , pn}, with pi ≥ 0 and
∑
i pi = 1, we
write H(p1, p2, · · · , pn) to be the classical or Shannon entropy of these values:
H(p1, · · · , pn) = −
∑
i pi log2 pi (where, as usual, 0 · log2 0 = 0). When given
only a single value p ∈ [0, 1], we write h(p) to mean H(p, 1− p).
Let ρ be a density operator acting on some finite dimensional Hilbert space
H. Then, we denote by S(ρ) its von Neumann entropy. Given the eigenvalues
{λi} of ρ, this value is: S(ρ) = −
∑
i λi log λi. (Note that all logarithms in this
paper are base two, unless otherwise specified.)
If ρAB is a density operator acting on the bipartite space HA ⊗HB , we will
often write S(AB) to denote the von Neumann entropy of ρAB and S(B) the
von Neumann entropy of ρB where ρB = trAρAB . We denote by S(A|B) the
von Neumann entropy of A’s system conditioned by B. That is: S(A|B) =
S(AB)− S(B) = S(ρAB)− S(trAρAB).
Given a number z ∈ C, we denote by Re(z) and Im(z), its real and imaginary
components respectively. The conjugate of z is denoted z∗. If U is a matrix
with complex entries, U∗ denotes its conjugate transpose.
We define the computational Z basis to be those states {|0〉 , |1〉}. We define
the Hadamard X basis to be those states {|+〉 , |−〉} where:
|±〉 = 1√
2
|0〉 ± 1√
2
|1〉 .
3 The Protocol
The protocol we consider is a semi-quantum one, utilizing a two-way quantum
channel (allowing a qubit to travel from A to B, then back to A), with B being
the limited semi-quantum or “classical” user. This means that, while A may
prepare and measure qubits in any basis of her choice (choosing different bases
each iteration of the quantum communication stage), B is limited to performing
one of two operations each iteration:
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1. He may Measure and Resend : the incoming qubit is subjected to a Z =
{|0〉 , |1〉} basis measurement. B will then resend his measurement result
to A (i.e., if he measures |r〉, for r ∈ {0, 1}, he will send a new qubit of
the form |r〉 back to A).
2. Or he may Reflect : the incoming qubit is ignored by B and simply reflected
back to A without otherwise disturbing it, or learning anything about its
state.
The SQKD protocol we consider in this paper was the one first presented in
[6]. A single iteration of this protocol’s quantum communication stage consists
of the following procedure:
1. A will prepare and send to B a qubit of the form |0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉, or |−〉,
choosing one at random.
2. B will choose randomly to either measure and resend or reflect the incom-
ing qubit.
• If he chooses to measure and resend, he will save his measurement
result as his raw key bit for this iteration.
3. A will choose to measure in the same basis she originally used to prepare
the qubit from step 1 (e.g., if she sent |−〉 on step 1, she will measure in
the X basis; if she originally sent |0〉 she will measure in the Z basis).
After repeating the above process M times, A will inform B, using the
public authenticated classical channel, of her preparation basis choice from step
1 (which determines her measurement basis choice in step 3) for each iteration.
For each iteration that was performed, B will inform A of his choice to measure
and resend, or to reflect. If B measured and resent, and if A chose to prepare
(step 1) and measure (step 3) in the Z basis, they will use this iteration for
their raw key. In this paper, we will define A’s key to be her measurement
result from step 3; B’s key will of course be his measurement result in step 2.
Another option, which we do not use in this paper, would be to define A’s key
to be her preparation choice in step 1.
Note that, if B reflects, and if A prepared and measured in the X basis, A
should expect to measure the same state she sent originally; any other result
is counted as an error. Thus, A may immediately estimate the noise of the
quantum channel in the X basis by counting the number of iterations where A
measures |−〉 if B reflected and she sent |+〉; similarly if she measures |+〉 but
sent |−〉. Measuring the error in the Z basis may be performed easily by B
divulging a portion of his measurement results. Note that this allows A and B
to estimate the Z basis error rate in both quantum channels: the forward (A to
B) and the reverse (B to A).
Note that, to improve efficiency, we may adopt a technique used in [16] to
modify the original BB84 [17] protocol. Namely, we may have A choose to
prepare and thus measure in the Z basis with greater probability than choosing
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the X basis. Likewise, we may have B choose to measure and resend more
frequently than reflecting. The same arguments used in [16] can apply to this
setting.
4 Security Proof
We will now prove security against collective attacks - those where E performs
the same operation each iteration, but may wait to perform a measurement of
her private ancilla until any future point in time of her choice. Later we will
consider security against general attacks.
Let HT be the two-dimensional Hilbert space modeling the qubit (the transit
space) and let HE be E’s private ancilla (this is finite without loss of generality)
for one iteration of the protocol. Let (UE , UF ) be a pair of unitary attack
operators which both act on HT ⊗ HE . Here, UE will be used to attack the
forward direction (the qubit traveling initially from A to B) while UF will be
used to attack the reverse direction (the qubit returning from B to A). This is,
without loss of generality, the most general form of a collective attack E may
use (collective attack implies she will use the same two unitary operators UE
and UF each iteration of the quantum communication stage and that E will
use a different “copy” of the space HE each iteration). In order to compute the
protocol’s key rate, we must first construct the density operator describing the
result of a single iteration of the protocol, assuming it is used to contribute to
the raw key: namely, assuming that A sent a Z basis state, B measures and
resends, and A measures in the Z basis.
In this event, A prepares a qubit of the form |0〉 or |1〉, each chosen with
probability 1/2. The system E receives then is the mixed state:
ρ0 =
1
2
|0〉 〈0|T +
1
2
|1〉 〈1|T .
We may assume, without loss of generality, that E’s ancilla is cleared to
some “zero” state |0〉E ∈ HE . E then attacks with UE , an operator which acts
on basis states as follows:
UE |0, 0〉TE = |0, e0〉TE + |1, e1〉TE (1)
UE |1, 0〉TE = |0, e2〉TE + |1, e3〉TE ,
where |ei〉 are arbitrary states in HE , not necessarily normalized nor orthogonal.
Of course, unitarity of U imposes the following conditions:
〈e0|e0〉+ 〈e1|e1〉 = 1
〈e2|e2〉+ 〈e3|e3〉 = 1
〈e0|e2〉+ 〈e1|e3〉 = 0.
After this operation, E passes the qubit to B who performs a Z basis mea-
surement, recording his result as his raw key bit, and resending his result to A.
At this point, the system is in the mixed state:
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ρ1 =
1
2
|0〉 〈0|B ⊗ (|0, e0〉 〈0, e0|TE + |0, e2〉 〈0, e2|TE)
+
1
2
|1〉 〈1|B ⊗ (|1, e1〉 〈1, e1|TE + |1, e3〉 〈1, e3|TE) .
Of course, E captures the transit qubit on its return, and applies her second
attack operator UF . We may write this operator’s action on states of the form
|i, ej〉 as follows:
UF |i, ej〉TE = |0, e0i,j〉TE + |1, e1i,j〉TE , (2)
where the |eki,j〉 are arbitrary states in HE . Unitarity of UF imposes several
conditions on these states of course - for instance 〈ej |ej〉 = 〈e0i,j |e0i,j〉+〈e1i,j |e1i,j〉,
for i = 0, 1.
After this attack, E passes the qubit to A who performs a Z basis measure-
ment, using the result as her raw key bit. Tracing out A’s system, leaving only
B and E’s, yields:
ρBE =
1
2
|0〉 〈0|B ⊗
(|e00,0〉 〈e00,0|+ |e10,0〉 〈e10,0|+ |e00,2〉 〈e00,2|+ |e10,2〉 〈e10,2|) (3)
+
1
2
|1〉 〈1|B ⊗
(|e01,1〉 〈e01,1|+ |e11,1〉 〈e11,1|+ |e01,3〉 〈e01,3|+ |e11,3〉 〈e11,3|) .
It is important to observe that A and B may estimate the Z basis noise
in both the forward channel and the reverse channel, during the parameter
estimation stage. In particular, they may estimate the quantity pi,j,k which we
use to denote the probability that, if A initially sends |i〉, then B measures |j〉,
and A measures |k〉. For example, if there is no noise in the Z basis, it should
hold that p0,0,0 = p1,1,1 = 1. These parameters can be used to estimate the
value 〈eca,b|eca,b〉.
For example, to estimate p0,1,0, consider the case that A first sends |0〉. After
E’s first attack, the state evolves to |0, e0〉+ |1, e1〉 and the probability that B
measures |1〉 is 〈e1|e1〉 after which the state collapses to |1, e1〉 /
√〈e1|e1〉. On
its return, the qubit is attacked again causing it to evolve to:
|0, e01,1〉+ |1, e11,1〉√〈e1|e1〉 ,
from which it is clear that the probability ofAmeasuring |0〉 is 〈e01,1|e01,1〉 / 〈e1|e1〉.
Combining all of this, we have (conditioning on the event that A sends |0〉):
p0,1,0 = Pr(B measures |1〉 and A measures |0〉)
= Pr(B measures |1〉)Pr(A measures |0〉 | B measures |1〉)
= 〈e1|e1〉
(
〈e01,1|e01,1〉
〈e1|e1〉
)
= 〈e01,1|e01,1〉 .
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Similarly, we may estimate the following:
p0,0,0 = 〈e00,0|e00,0〉 p1,1,1 = 〈e11,3|e11,3〉 (4)
p0,0,1 = 〈e10,0|e10,0〉 p1,1,0 = 〈e01,3|e01,3〉
p0,1,0 = 〈e01,1|e01,1〉 p1,0,1 = 〈e10,2|e10,2〉
p0,1,1 = 〈e11,1|e11,1〉 p1,0,0 = 〈e00,2|e00,2〉
4.1 Bounding S(B|E)
Before continuing, we need a small lemma concerning the von Neumann entropy
of a particular form of system. The result is not difficult to show, however we
include the proof for completeness.
Lemma 1. Let H = HX ⊗HY be a bipartite Hilbert space with dimHX = n
and dimHY = m (both finite dimensional) and let {|1〉X , · · · , |n〉X} be an
orthonormal basis of HX . Consider the density operator:
ρ =
n∑
j=1
pj |j〉 〈j|X ⊗ σj ,
acting on H, where each σj is a Hermitian, positive semi-definite operator,
of unit trace, acting on HY . Furthermore, assume trρ = 1 (which implies∑
j pj = 1). Then:
S(ρ) = H (p1, p2, · · · , pn) +
n∑
j=1
pjS (σj) . (5)
Proof. Choosing a suitable basis, we may write ρ as:
ρ ≡

p1σ1 0 0 · · · 0
0 p2σ2 0 · · · 0
...
...
0 0 0 · · · pnσn
 (6)
Let {λji}mi=1 be the eigenvalues of σj . Since each σj is Hermitian, positive
semi-definite, these are real and non-negative. Since each σj is of unit trace, it
holds that
∑
i λ
j
i = 1 for all j = 1, 2, · · · , n. Clearly, the eigenvalues of ρ then
are:
n⋃
j=1
m⋃
i=1
{
pjλ
j
i
}
.
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We now compute S(ρ):
S(ρ) = −
n∑
j=1
m∑
i=1
pjλ
j
i log pjλ
j
i
= −
n∑
j=1
m∑
i=1
(
pjλ
j
i log pj + pjλ
j
i log λ
j
i
)
= −
n∑
j=1
pj log pj
m∑
i=1
λji −
n∑
j=1
pj
m∑
i=1
λji log λ
j
i
= H(p1, · · · , pn) +
n∑
j=1
pjS(σj).
We now return to our security analysis. To compute the key rate, we
must compute S(B|E) = S(BE) − S(E) using Equation 3. Due to the high-
dimensionality of HE , this is difficult and so we will employ a technique similar
to one used in [18] for proving the security of BB84 [17], though suitably mod-
ified for our purposes: that is, we will condition on a new random variable of
our choice, in order to simplify the analysis. Due to the strong sub additivity of
von Neumann entropy, it holds that, for any tripartite system HX ⊗HY ⊗HZ :
S(X|Y ) ≥ S(X|Y Z).
If we introduce a new system HC into Equation 3, it will hold that:
S(B|E)−H(B|A) ≥ S(B|EC)−H(B|A),
thus providing us with a lower-bound on the key rate of this protocol.
LetHC be the four dimensional space spanned by {|C, 0〉 , |C, 1〉 , |W, 1〉 , |W, 2〉}.
We will use the state |C, i〉 〈C, i| to represent the event that A and B’s raw key
bits agree/match (that is, they are “correct”) and that the qubit sent from A
was flipped i times (in the Z basis, which is all we are considering for now as X
basis states do not contribute to the raw key and will be considered later). For
example, if A sends a |0〉, B measures a |1〉, and A measures a |1〉, this will be
the event |C, 1〉 〈C, 1|. Similarly for the state |W, i〉 〈W, i| where now A and B’s
raw key bits do not match (they are “wrong”). (Note that in [18], the authors
only conditioned on the “correct” or “wrong” events which was sufficient in the
one-way quantum channel case.)
Incorporating this new system yields the mixed state:
ρBEC =
1
2
|0〉 〈0|B ⊗ (|C, 0〉 〈C, 0| ⊗ |e00,0〉 〈e00,0|+ |W, 1〉 〈W, 1| ⊗ |e10,0〉 〈e10,0|
+ |C, 1〉 〈C, 1| ⊗ |e00,2〉 〈e00,2|+ |W, 2〉 〈W, 2| ⊗ |e10,2〉 〈e10,2|)
+
1
2
|1〉 〈1|B ⊗ (|W, 2〉 〈W, 2| ⊗ |e01,1〉 〈e01,1|+ |C, 1〉 〈C, 1| ⊗ |e11,1〉 〈e11,1|
+ |W, 1〉 〈W, 1| ⊗ |e01,3〉 〈e01,3|+ |C, 0〉 〈C, 0| ⊗ |e11,3〉 〈e11,3|)
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Note that it is not relevant that A and B cannot know whether their key bit
is “correct” or not (on those iterations not used for parameter estimation of
course). By conditioning on these events, however, we are able to compute a
lower bound on the protocol’s key rate. The actual key rate may be higher
of course. One may think of this as providing E with additional information
which can only increase her power, thus providing us with a lower-bound on the
protocol’s security.
Choosing a suitable basis, we may write ρBEC as a diagonal matrix, where
the diagonal entries are elements of the form 12 〈eki,j |eki,j〉 for all |eki,j〉 which
appear in the above equation. Thus:
S(BEC) = S(ρBEC) = H
(
1
2
〈e00,0|e00,0〉 , · · · ,
1
2
〈e11,3|e11,3〉
)
(7)
= H
(
1
2
p0,0,0,
1
2
p0,0,1, · · · , 1
2
p1,1,1
)
,
where the arguments in the (Shannon) entropy function above are all pi,j,k from
Equation 4. This is a quantity that A and B may compute after parameter
estimation.
What remains is to bound S(EC). Tracing out B from ρBEC yields:
ρEC = |C, 0〉 〈C, 0| ⊗
(
1
2
σ1
)
+ |C, 1〉 〈C, 1| ⊗
(
1
2
σ2
)
+ |W, 1〉 〈W, 1| ⊗
(
1
2
σ3
)
+ |W, 2〉 〈W, 2| ⊗
(
1
2
σ4
)
,
where σi are the positive semi-definite operators:
σ1 = |e00,0〉 〈e00,0|+ |e11,3〉 〈e11,3|
σ2 = |e00,2〉 〈e00,2|+ |e11,1〉 〈e11,1|
σ3 = |e10,0〉 〈e10,0|+ |e01,3〉 〈e01,3|
σ4 = |e10,2〉 〈e10,2|+ |e01,1〉 〈e01,1|
Assume, for now, that trσj > 0 for all j = 1, 2, 3, 4. Let tj = trσj and define
σ˜j = σj/tj . Then we may write ρEC as:
ρEC = |C, 0〉 〈C, 0| ⊗
(
1
2
t1σ˜1
)
+ |C, 1〉 〈C, 1| ⊗
(
1
2
t2σ˜2
)
+ |W, 1〉 〈W, 1| ⊗
(
1
2
t3σ˜3
)
+ |W, 2〉 〈W, 2| ⊗
(
1
2
t4σ˜4
)
.
Each σ˜j is a positive semi-definite operator of unit trace. Also, since trρEC =
1 implies 12 t1+· · ·+ 12 t4 = 1, we may apply Lemma 1 to the above state yielding:
S(EC) = S(ρEC) = H
(
1
2
t1, · · · , 1
2
t4
)
+
1
2
4∑
j=1
tjS(σ˜j).
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We assumed tj > 0 above. If there is a tj = 0, then observe σj ≡ 0. Indeed:
trσj = 0 ⇐⇒ 〈ezx,y|ezx,y〉+ 〈eca,b|eca,b〉 = 0,
for appropriate a, b, c, x, y, z. But, since 〈e|e〉 ≥ 0 for any vector e, this forces
〈ezx,y|ezx,y〉 = 〈eca,b|eca,b〉 = 0 which is true only if |ezx,y〉 ≡ |eca,b〉 ≡ 0. Thus, if
trσj = 0, then σj ≡ 0, and so it could simply be removed from the description of
ρEC above, and any reference to the j’th matrix is removed from the subsequent
computation of S(EC).
Of course t1 = trσ1 = 〈e00,0|e00,0〉 + 〈e11,3|e11,3〉 = p0,0,0 + p1,1,1, and similarly
for the other σj . Observing that each σj is a two-dimensional system, we may
use the trivial bound S(σ˜j) ≤ 1 to show:
S(EC) ≤ H
(
1
2
(p0,0,0 + p1,1,1),
1
2
(p1,0,0 + p0,1,1),
1
2
(p0,0,1 + p1,1,0),
1
2
(p1,0,1 + p0,1,0)
)
+
1
2
(p1,0,0 + p0,1,1 + p0,0,1 + p1,1,0 + p1,0,1 + p0,1,0)
+
1
2
(p0,0,0 + p1,1,1)S(σ˜1).
Note that this bound holds even if there is a tj = 0. Thus, at this point, there
is no need to take extra care of such a case.
If the noise of the quantum channel is low, the values pi,j,k should be low,
except for p0,0,0 and p1,1,1 which should be high. All that remains, therefore, is
to upper bound S(σ˜1).
Let us first find the eigenvalues of σ1 (the unnormalized version); the eigen-
values of σ˜1 then will simply be scalar multiples of these. We may write
|e00,0〉 = √p0,0,0 |e〉 and |e11,3〉 = α |e〉+ β |ζ〉, where 〈e|e〉 = 〈ζ|ζ〉 = 1, 〈e|ζ〉 = 0,
and α, β ∈ C. This further implies:
|α|2 + |β|2 = 〈e11,3|e11,3〉 = p1,1,1 (8)
α
√
p0,0,0 = 〈e00,0|e11,3〉 ⇒ |α|2 =
| 〈e00,0|e11,3〉 |2
p0,0,0
(9)
(we may assume that p0,0,0 > 0; otherwise, there is too much noise, and A and
B will abort). In this {|e〉 , |ζ〉} basis, we may write σ1 as:
σ1 ≡
 p0,0,0 + |α|2 αβ∗
α∗β |β|2
 .
The eigenvalues of σ1, denoted λ+ and λ−, are:
λ± =
1
2
(
p0,0,0 + p1,1,1 ±
√
(p0,0,0 + |α|2 − |β|2)2 + 4|α|2|β|2
)
=
1
2
(
p0,0,0 + p1,1,1 ±
√
(p0,0,0 − p1,1,1 + 2|α|2)2 + 4|α|2|β|2
)
,
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where, above, we have used the identity |α|2 + |β|2 = p1,1,1 ⇒ −|β|2 = |α|2 −
p1,1,1. Let ∆ = p0,0,0 − p1,1,1 and, using the identity |β|2 = p1,1,1 − |α|2, we
continue:
λ± =
1
2
(
p0,0,0 + p1,1,1 ±
√
∆2 + 4|α|4 + 4∆|α|2 + 4|α|2(p1,1,1 − |α|2)
)
=
1
2
(
p0,0,0 + p1,1,1 ±
√
∆2 + 4|α|2(|α|2 + ∆ + p1,1,1 − |α|2)
)
=
1
2
(
p0,0,0 + p1,1,1 ±
√
(p0,0,0 − p1,1,1)2 + 4|α|2p0,0,0
)
.
Finally, using Equation 9, we have:
λ± =
1
2
(
p0,0,0 + p1,1,1 ±
√
(p0,0,0 − p1,1,1)2 + 4| 〈e00,0|e11,3〉 |2
)
. (10)
From this, the eigenvalues of σ˜1 = σ1/trσ1 = σ1/(p0,0,0 + p1,1,1) are:
λ˜± =
1
2
±
√
(p0,0,0 − p1,1,1)2 + 4| 〈e00,0|e11,3〉 |2
2(p0,0,0 + p1,1,1)
, (11)
and so:
S(σ˜1) = −λ˜+ log λ˜+ − λ˜− log λ˜− = h(λ˜+),
a function which depends only on the quantity | 〈e00,0|e11,3〉 |2 ≥ 0. Note that, as
| 〈e00,0|e11,3〉 |2 decreases to zero, this causes λ˜± to become closer to 1/2, which
causes S(σ˜1) to increase (this function taking its maximum when λ˜± = 12 ).
Thus, to find a lower bound for the key rate r ≥ S(BEC)− S(EC)−H(B|A),
we must find a lower bound on | 〈e00,0|e11,3〉 |2 (thus upper bounding S(EC)).
Indeed, if | 〈e00,0|e11,3〉 |2 ≥ B, then S(σ˜1) = h(λ˜+) ≤ h(λ˜), where:
λ˜ =
1
2
+
√
(p0,0,0 − p1,1,1)2 + 4B
2(p0,0,0 + p1,1,1)
. (12)
4.2 Using the X Basis Noise
We will lower bound the value | 〈e00,0|e11,3〉 |2, by considering the noise in the X
basis (note that, thus far, we have considered only the noise in the Z basis).
Assume now that A sends an X basis state |+〉 or |−〉 initially, B chooses to
reflect, and A measures in the X basis, thus allowing her to estimate the channel
noise in this basis.
In this event, B’s operation is essentially the identity operator and, so, if A
sends the state |a〉 (either |+〉 or |−〉 in our case), the state returning to her,
after it passed through E twice, is simply |a′〉 = V |a〉, where V = UFUE (the
same operators used last section). Using Equations 1 and 2, we may describe
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V ’s action on basis states |0〉 , |1〉 ∈ HT as follows (as before, assuming, without
loss of generality, that E’s ancilla is cleared to the zero state |0〉E):
V |0, 0〉TE = UF (|0, e0〉+ |1, e1〉)
= |0〉 ⊗ (|e00,0〉+ |e01,1〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
|f0〉
) + |1〉 ⊗ (|e10,0〉+ |e11,1〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
|f1〉
)
= |0, f0〉+ |1, f1〉
V |1, 0〉TE = UF (|0, e2〉+ |1, e3〉)
= |0〉 ⊗ (|e00,2〉+ |e01,3〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
|f2〉
) + |1〉 ⊗ (|e10,2〉+ |e11,3〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
|f3〉
)
= |0, f2〉+ |1, f3〉 .
Since UE and UF are both unitary, so is V = UFUE which implies:
〈f0|f0〉+ 〈f1|f1〉 = 1 (13)
〈f2|f2〉+ 〈f3|f3〉 = 1
〈f0|f2〉+ 〈f1|f3〉 = 0.
By linearity, we have:
V |+, 0〉TE = |+, g0〉+ |−, g1〉 (14)
V |−, 0〉TE = |+, g2〉+ |−, g3〉 ,
where:
|g0〉 = 1
2
(|f0〉+ |f1〉+ |f2〉+ |f3〉) (15)
|g1〉 = 1
2
(|f0〉 − |f1〉+ |f2〉 − |f3〉)
|g2〉 = 1
2
(|f0〉+ |f1〉 − |f2〉 − |f3〉)
|g3〉 = 1
2
(|f0〉 − |f1〉 − |f2〉+ |f3〉).
In this notation, the probability that A measures |−〉 if she originally sent |+〉
and B reflected, is 〈g1|g1〉; similarly, 〈g2|g2〉 is the probability that A measures
|+〉 if she originally sent |−〉. These quantities, which A may estimate in the
parameter estimation stage, represent the error E’s attack induces in the X
basis.
Let p+− be the probability that A measures |−〉 if she sends |+〉 (assuming
B reflected); similarly define p−+ as the probability that A measures |+〉 if she
initially sent |−〉. Then, using Equations 13, 14, and 15, we have:
p+− = 〈g1|g1〉 = 1
2
+
1
2
Re(−〈f0|f1〉 − 〈f0|f3〉 − 〈f1|f2〉 − 〈f2|f3〉)
p−+ = 〈g2|g2〉 = 1
2
+
1
2
Re(〈f0|f1〉 − 〈f0|f3〉 − 〈f1|f2〉+ 〈f2|f3〉).
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Summing these two and expanding yields:
p+− + p−+ = 1−Re(〈f0|f3〉+ 〈f1|f2〉)
= 1−Re(〈e00,0|e10,2〉+ 〈e00,0|e11,3〉+ 〈e01,1|e10,2〉+ 〈e01,1|e11,3〉)
−Re(〈e10,0|e00,2〉+ 〈e10,0|e01,3〉+ 〈e11,1|e00,2〉+ 〈e11,1|e01,3〉).
Solving for Re(〈e00,0|e11,3〉 provides us with the expression:
Re(〈e00,0|e11,3〉) = 1− p+− − p−+ −Re(〈e00,0|e10,2〉+ 〈e01,1|e10,2〉)
−Re(〈e01,1|e11,3〉+ 〈e10,0|e00,2〉+ 〈e10,0|e01,3〉)
−Re(〈e11,1|e00,2〉+ 〈e11,1|e01,3〉)
Observe that, for any two vectors |x〉 and |y〉, it holds: |Re(〈x|y〉)| ≤
| 〈x|y〉 | ≤√〈x|x〉 〈y|y〉, the first inequality is obvious, the last inequality is due
to the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. Thus, Re(〈x|y〉) ∈ [−√〈x|x〉 〈y|y〉,√〈x|x〉 〈y|y〉].
Using this fact, and Equation 4, yields:
Re(〈e00,0|e11,3〉) ≥ 1− p+− − p−+ −
√
p0,0,0p1,0,1 −√p0,1,0p1,0,1 (16)
−√p0,1,0p1,1,1 −√p0,0,1p1,0,0 −√p0,0,1p1,1,0
−√p0,1,1p1,0,0 −√p0,1,1p1,1,0 = B.
Observing that | 〈e00,0|e11,3〉 |2 = Re2(〈e00,0|e11,3〉)+Im2(〈e00,0|e11,3〉) ≥ Re2(〈e00,0|e11,3〉),
the right hand side of Equation 16 (denoted B), assuming it is non-negative
(which should be the case if the noise is small enough), may be used to lower
bound | 〈e00,0|e11,3〉 |2, thus upper bounding S(EC) as required.
Indeed, let:
B =
{
B2 if B ≥ 0
0 otherwise
,
then, from the above discussion, it is clear that | 〈e00,0|e11,3〉 |2 ≥ B (note that
| 〈e00,0|e1,3〉 |2 is always non-negative, so it makes sense to “cap” B at zero in the
event B < 0). Using this, with Equation 12 and the discussion immediately
above it, gives us a bound on S(σ˜1) and thus a bound on the quantity S(EC).
4.3 Final Key Rate Bound
All that remains is to compute H(B|A) = H(B,A) − H(A). However, this is
easily done given A and B’s estimate of the Z basis error rate. Indeed, let pA(0)
be the probability that A’s raw key bit is zero. This value is simply:
pA(0) =
1
2
(p0,0,0 + p0,1,0 + p1,1,0 + p1,0,0), (17)
and so:
H(A) = H(pA(0), 1− pA(0)) = h(pA(0)).
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Let p(b, a) be the probability that B’s raw key bit is b while A’s is a. These
values are:
p(0, 0) =
1
2
(p0,0,0 + p1,0,0) p(1, 1) =
1
2
(p0,1,1 + p1,1,1) (18)
p(0, 1) =
1
2
(p0,0,1 + p1,0,1) p(1, 0) =
1
2
(p0,1,0 + p1,1,0),
from which the value of H(B,A) may be computed directly.
Putting everything together, the key rate r is lower-bounded by:
r ≥H
(
1
2
p0,0,0,
1
2
p0,0,1, · · · , 1
2
p1,1,1
)
(19)
−H
(
1
2
(p0,0,0 + p1,1,1),
1
2
(p1,0,0 + p0,1,1),
1
2
(p0,0,1 + p1,1,0),
1
2
(p1,0,1 + p0,1,0)
)
− 1
2
(p1,0,0 + p0,1,1 + p0,0,1 + p1,1,0 + p1,0,1 + p0,1,0)
− 1
2
(p0,0,0 + p1,1,1)h(λ˜)
+ h (pA(0))−H (p(0, 0), p(0, 1), p(1, 0), p(1, 1)) ,
where λ˜ is from Equation 12.
This key rate equation is a function, easily computed, depending only on
parameters that may be estimated by A and B.
4.4 Security Against General Attacks
The above proves security against collective attacks. However, after the proto-
col, A and B may symmetrize their raw key by permuting it using a randomly
chosen, and publicly disclosed, permutation. This makes the protocol permu-
tation invariant, in which case, as shown in [4, 5], security against collective
attacks is sufficient to prove security against any arbitrary general attack. Thus,
we have proven this protocol’s unconditional security.
4.5 Examples
Our work above allows A and B to compute the final fraction of secure secret
key bits that they can distill after privacy amplification, using only the observed
statistics pi,j,k, p+−, and p−+. Let us now demonstrate our key rate bound on
certain examples. In particular, let us assume that E’s attack is symmetric in
that it can be characterized as follows:
1. Let
−→
Q denote the probability that if A sends |i〉 initially, B measures
|1− i〉, for i = 0, 1.
2. Let
←−
Q denote the probability that if B sends |i〉, then A measures |1− i〉,
for i = 0, 1 (independently of the first channel).
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−→
Q =
←−
Q = Q
−→
Q = Q/2,
←−
Q = Q
−→
Q = Q and
←−
Q = Q/2
QX = Q/2 Q ≤ 5.92% Q ≤ 6.98% Q ≤ 8.96%
QX = Q Q ≤ 5.34% Q ≤ 6.16% Q ≤ 7.79%
QX = 2Q Q ≤ 4.51% Q ≤ 5.05% Q ≤ 6.25%
Table 1: Showing the maximal value of Q, in a variety of scenarios, for which
the key rate (Equation 19) remains positive.
−→
Q represents the probability that
a |i〉 flips to a |1− i〉 in the forward direction (A to B) while ←−Q represents the
probability that a |i〉 flips to |1− i〉 in the reverse direction (B to A). Finally,
QX is the probability that A measures |±〉 if she sent |∓〉 and B reflects.
3. Let p+− = p−+ = QX .
We remark that A and B may estimate these three parameters and, in fact,
can even enforce the restriction that E use such a symmetric attack, a strategy
used in other fully quantum protocols [18] (though in those protocols, there was
only one quantum channel to consider).
In this case we have:
p0,0,0 = p1,1,1 = (1−−→Q)(1−←−Q)
p0,0,1 = p1,1,0 = (1−−→Q)←−Q
p0,1,0 = p1,0,1 =
−→
Q
←−
Q
p0,1,1 = p1,0,0 =
−→
Q(1−←−Q)
Recall that, so long as r > 0, A and B may distill a secure secret key. We
consider three scenarios (summarized in Table 1):
1.
−→
Q =
←−
Q = Q. In this case:
• If QX = Q, we see that r > 0 for all Q ≤ 5.34%.
• If QX = 2Q, then r > 0 for all Q ≤ 4.51%.
• If QX = Q/2, then the key rate, r, is positive for all Q ≤ 5.92%.
See Figure 1.
2.
−→
Q = Q/2,
←−
Q = Q. In this case:
• If QX = Q, then r > 0 for all Q ≤ 6.16%.
• If QX = 2Q, the key rate is positive for Q ≤ 5.05%.
• If QX = Q/2, then r > 0 for Q ≤ 6.98%.
See Figure 2.
3.
−→
Q = Q and
←−
Q = Q/2. Then:
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Figure 1: Key rate bound when the Z basis noise in the forward channel is
the same as the noise in the reverse; that is,
−→
Q =
←−
Q = Q. Solid line is when
QX = Q (where QX is the X basis noise). Dashed line is when QX = Q/2;
finally, the dotted line (lower) is for QX = 2Q.
• If QX = Q, we see r is positive for Q ≤ 7.79%.
• If QX = 2Q then r > 0 for Q ≤ 6.25%.
• If QX = Q/2 then r > 0 for Q ≤ 8.96%.
See Figure 3.
Our results clearly show that one of the important factors (though not the
only one) to this SQKD protocol’s key rate, is the noise in the return quantum
channel, connecting B to A. This makes sense, as any noise in the forward
channel does not directly lead to an error in A and B’s raw key bit and, thus,
does not lead to additional information leaking due to error correction (though
an attack in the forward direction might increase E’s information - a factor our
key rate bound takes into account; in fact, a particular two-way eavesdropping
strategy was shown in [19] which provided a greater advantage to E than by
her simply attacking a single channel).
Interestingly, considering the case when
−→
Q =
←−
Q = QX = Q, even though
this protocol cannot withstand as high an error rate as BB84 [17], which main-
tains a positive key rate for Q = QX ≤ 11%; this protocol is comparable to a
three state variant of BB84 [15] which can withstand up to 4.25% in this sce-
nario. It is also comparable to B92 [14] which can withstand up to 4.8% error
(assuming no preprocessing and a depolarization channel) before the key rate
drops to zero [2]. Thus, this proves that even though we are limiting B’s capa-
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Figure 2: Key rate bound when
−→
Q = Q/2 while
←−
Q = Q. Solid line is when
QX = Q. Dashed line is when QX = Q/2; finally, the dotted line (lower) is for
QX = 2Q.
Figure 3: Key rate bound when
−→
Q = Q while
←−
Q = Q/2. Solid line is when
QX = Q. Dashed line is when QX = Q/2; finally, the dotted line (lower) is for
QX = 2Q.
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bilities in the semi-quantum setting, we are still capable of getting comparable
tolerable noise thresholds compared to “fully” quantum protocols.
5 Closing Remarks
We have proven, for the first time, the unconditional security of a multi-state
semi-quantum key distribution protocol. Our bound may not be tight due to
our conditioning on the additional random variable C. However, it does show
that this protocol is comparable to B92 [14] and the three-state BB84 [15], at
least in terms of maximally allowed noise in the perfect qubit scenario.
We also showed that this protocol is most sensitive to noise in the reverse
quantum channel (connecting B to A). Thus, if a practical implementation
were constructed, one may make less effort to control the noise in the forward
direction channel than the reverse.
It might be possible to adapt the technique we used in this paper to the
security proof of other SQKD protocols (for instance the three and two state
protocols described in [9]). It would be interesting to compare the key rate
bounds of these various protocols.
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